

ARTICLE

Party Families as a Cross-Cutting Cleavage on the Individual Level: The case of Belgium

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Abstract

Within divided societies, state-wide political parties have the potential to serve as a cross-cutting cleavage on the individual level. Belgium is an exception in this regard, as there are hardly any parties that are active across the entire country. However, in the regions, parties from the same party family are present, and the assumption is that these “sibling parties” can function in a manner similar to a national party. Using the 2019 CSES Belgian dataset, this study examines whether sibling parties can attract similar voters across the ethnocultural cleavage and, therefore, act as a cross-cutting cleavage at the individual level. Results show that in Belgium, regional differences within party families tend to be limited, with the Greens serving as the most coherent party family, and the Liberals as the least coherent. We close with some speculations about what these findings imply for the stabilising function of party families within a divided political system.

Keywords: Divided societies, Belgium, Party family, Sibling parties, Cleavages, Vote choice, CSES Belgium

Introduction

A crucial aspect of the debate on divided societies is the question of whether citizens from different regions in these societies will eventually drift apart. The political developments over the past decades in divided societies like Belgium (Flanders), Canada (Quebec), Spain (Catalonia) and the United Kingdom (Scotland) would at first sight seem to support the idea that regions drift apart: sub-state nationalist parties have successfully established themselves and all four countries have been beset by

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periods of political instability caused by ethnocultural conflicts. Nevertheless, recent research indicates that, at the voter level, regional differences in public opinion tend to remain relatively stable over time (Hooghe & Stiers, 2022a; Stiers & Hooghe, 2023).

Ideology and party allegiance may play an important part in explaining why, despite the existence of distinct political systems in these divided societies, there is little indication of further regional divergence among voters. Recent studies in Canada suggest that public opinion is divided based on political preferences or values, rather than being tied to an ethnolinguistic group (Montpetit et al., 2017). Additionally, research in the US, the UK, Belgium, and Spain has shown that partisanship is stronger than social ties (Westwood et al., 2018). It appears, therefore, that ideological alignment could act as a cross-cutting cleavage, preventing voters from drifting apart (Lijphart, 1977).

The importance of cross-cutting cleavages is also expressed by authors who highlight the need for divided societies to have state-wide parties rather than parties that exclusively reflect the ethnocultural divide (Horowitz, 1993; Niessen et al., 2020). However, with the process of federalisation, regions in divided societies have developed their own political system, often leading to the regionalisation of state-wide parties or even a complete disaggregation, as is the case in Belgium (Hepburn, 2010). This might have important implications for the cross-cutting function of ideology: voters who share the same ideological preferences will no longer be able to vote for the same party if they belong to different regions. Similarly, voters who belong to different regions no longer have the possibility to have or develop partisanship for the same party. The regional split of the party system could thus entail that ideology can no longer function as a cross-cutting cleavage for citizens in divided societies.

The existence of party families within a divided society may, however, compensate for this absence, as many parties have a regional counterpart with which they share an ideology, origin, name, and/or links (for Belgium, see Deschouwer et al., 2017). The question then remains whether these party families have the same moderating effects as national parties are supposed to have. In other words, do party families, by sharing the same ideology, function as a cross-cutting cleavage on the individual level in societies divided by an ethnocultural cleavage?

Although ample research has been conducted on the dynamics at play in divided societies, few studies have focused on the role of voting behaviour within these societies. Moreover, except for Medeiros et al. (2022), little research has focused on regional differences within party families, as public opinion is often represented as two opposing homogeneous blocs. Nevertheless, this focus could add to a better understanding of differences within divided societies. This study aims to address this lacuna by focusing specifically on Belgium, which serves as a conservative test case. As explained further below, the country's features, with its bipolar federalism and a party system divided along the linguistic divide (Delpérée, 2013; Vandenberghe, 2023),

may make it more difficult for party families to act as a cross-cutting cleavage at the individual level. The main research question of this study is whether, in the Belgian context, party families can attract voters with a similar profile across the ethnocultural divide. The study remains limited to voter behaviour, and therefore, it should be clear that no statements are made about party strategy in this regard.

Literature

Divided Societies and cross-cutting cleavages

The term divided societies refers to societies that are divided by politically salient segmental cleavages along which political and societal actors organise themselves (Choudhry, 2008; Lijphart, 1977). These cleavages are generated by ascriptive ties “based on terminal identities with high political salience” (Lustick, 1979, p. 325). More specifically, as Lijphart (1977) notes (pp. 3-4), these “Segmental cleavages may be of a religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural, racial or ethnic nature”. Due to the diversity in nature of these cleavages, multiple terms have been used to refer to these segmental cleavages, such as ethno-territorial (Vandenberghe, 2023), ethnocultural (Choudhry, 2008; Kennedy, 2020), ethno-linguistic (Erk & Anderson, 2009), or ethno-regional (Medeiros et al., 2015). It is important to note that this study uses the more overarching term ethnocultural cleavage when addressing general theory, but uses the concept of linguistic cleavage when addressing the Belgian case specifically.

The (in)stability of divided societies remains intensively debated among scholars, as the presence of a highly politically salient ethnocultural cleavage can be an important source of conflict. To reduce instability and conflict on this cleavage, it is essential to have other salient cleavages that crosscut the ethnocultural one (Lijphart, 1977). The presence of cross-cutting cleavages is important as it entails that actors that are opponents on one issue (e.g., belonging to different regions) would be allies on another (e.g., sharing the same ideological preferences). This could, on the one hand, lead parties to adopt more moderate positions in order to attract more voters, and, on the other hand, cause voters to make more moderate demands (Goodin, 1975).

When discussing the mechanisms that could help divided societies achieve stability, scholars emphasise the importance of two key elements: power sharing or shared rule and group autonomy or self-rule (Elazar, 1987; Lijphart, 2004). Federalism is, therefore, often proposed as a suitable tool for conflict management (Gagnon & Tremblay, 2020; Kennedy, 2020). Indeed, several divided societies have established federal structures, whether these are embodied in ‘practices of federalism’, such as in Spain and the United Kingdom, or states that are formal institutionalised federations, such as Belgium and Canada (Kennedy, 2020). However, the claim that federalism could appease ethnocultural conflicts is contested by some scholars who argue

that these structures might facilitate the development of distinct political systems within these societies (Erk & Anderson, 2009; Keil & Alber, 2020; Swenden, 2013). This would actually drive communities further apart, rather than resolving conflicts. This is referred to as the paradox of federalism: federalism institutionalises the ethnocultural cleavage, leading to the creation of distinct political systems within one state, which exacerbates conflicts and leads to further disintegration (Erk & Anderson, 2009).

Voters and parties in divided societies

The fact that distinct political systems develop along the ethnocultural cleavage, with regions developing their own political and societal institutions, could have important effects on voters and parties in divided societies. On the societal level, the development of distinct political systems can lead to citizens experiencing different socialisation processes (Dupuy et al., 2021). Voters are socialised in different systems, and thus may develop distinct political preferences, which could ultimately lead to a regional divergence in public opinion. For example, Dupuy et al. (2021) found that institutional regionalisation has affected Belgian citizens' attitudes on the centre-periphery cleavage, expressed by the level of support for (de)centralisation. On the electoral level, the development of distinct political systems also entails the regionalisation of state-wide party systems. Having a state-wide party system is important for the political elite to have electoral incentives to attract voters beyond their ethnical group, forcing politicians to take more moderate stances on ethnic issues (Horowitz, 1993; Reilly, 2009). In the absence of such incentives, as may be the case in divided societies with distinct regional party systems, politicians can, with impunity, exacerbate and outbid other parties on ethnic issues (Caluwaerts & Reuchamps, 2015). This situation can impact the crosscutting power of other cleavages. In a divided society such as Belgium, "the regionalisation of the party system increased the salience of the ethno-regionalist cleavage" (Swenden & Jans, 2006, p. 880), causing it to become dominant and reducing the crosscutting power of other cleavages (Rabushka & Shepsle, 1972). Additionally, the regionalisation of party systems may also fuel sub-state nationalist parties that advocate for secessionism and attempt to mobilise voters on the ethnocultural cleavage (Masseti & Schakel, 2016). As such, voters' choice in divided societies may depend primarily on the voter's position on the ethnocultural cleavage (Medeiros et al., 2015; Tilley, Garry & Matthews, 2021).

However, findings of recent research suggest that the creation of distinct political systems in divided societies has not necessarily impacted the crosscutting power of other cleavages, nor led to a stark regional divergence among the electorate. When examining citizens' attitudes on various cleavages, such as the economic, cultural, or linguistic ones, regional differences in public opinion remain relatively stable over time (Hooghe & Stiers, 2022a; Stiers & Hooghe, 2023). Additionally, research indicates that ideological preferences, on both the economic and cultural

dimensions, and values remain an important determinant of the vote choice, regardless of the salience of the ethnocultural cleavage (Montpetit et al., 2017; Rivero, 2015). Medeiros et al. (2022) also find that voters from similar ideological parties share more similarities with each other than that they do with voters from the same ethnolinguistic group. These studies suggest that voters with similar preferences will behave similarly, regardless of a regional divide. Yet, although studies indicate that the regional differences among the electorate are more nuanced, voters who share the same ideological preferences but who belong to different regions, cannot always vote for one and the same party due to the absence of state-wide parties. Nonetheless, these voters often can vote for a regional party of the same party family. In that case, party families could act as a crosscutting cleavage on the individual level by attracting similar voters across the ethnocultural divide.

The term “party family” can be used to group parties across countries and time periods. As Mair and Mudde (1998, p. 225) state “The core of the classification of party families rests on the uncovering of a shared political goal that, in turn, harks back to the parties’ core identities.” As such, the authors distinguish four criteria to group parties that belong to different party systems together in one family, namely having a common origin, transnational links, a shared ideology, and a shared name (Mair & Mudde, 1998). Party families are found all over electoral democracies and although some variation exists between parties and/or countries, the profile of their voters tends to be similar in terms of sociodemographic traits and values (Carter et al., 2023). Although the term is generally used to group parties across countries, it can also be applied to parties *within* divided societies. Indeed, parties that are divided across the ethnocultural cleavage, and therefore operate in distinct party systems but within the same country, could still be grouped according to the four criteria of Mair and Mudde (Deschouwer et al., 2017). What is interesting here is the question whether, and how, the specific ethnocultural cleavage in divided societies has shaped party families. For example, in divided societies such as Spain and the UK, parties have not split completely into regional variants, yet a substantial decentralisation occurred (Hepburn & Detterbeck, 2013). On the other hand, in the cases of Canada (for the Liberal and Conservative parties) and Belgium, the once state-wide parties have split into regional variants. These parties, which split along the regional divide within their country yet still belong to the same party family due to their common origin and shared ideology, are referred to as *sibling parties* (Deschouwer et al., 2017; Medeiros et al., 2022).

Belgium: one country, two political systems

Belgium, with its specific features and political structures, offers a conservative test to investigate whether determinants of vote choice differ between voters who belong to different regions, yet vote for sibling parties.

First, as stipulated in the Belgian Constitution, Belgium is a federal state composed of three 'communities' (Flemish, French and German-speaking communities) and three 'regions' (Flemish, Walloon and Brussels regions). This adoption of federalism came as a reaction to the centre-periphery cleavage, occurring in the form of a linguistic cleavage in Belgium, with two opposing communities, namely a Dutch-speaking group mainly concentrated in the Northern part (Flanders) and a French-speaking group mainly concentrated in the Southern part of the country (Wallonia) (Deschouwer, 2012). The complex federal structure is the result of six state reforms, each of which transferred powers from the federal to the regional levels. As a result, the Belgian federation emerged over time, with no clear endpoint, and with a centrifugal tendency (Deschouwer, 2009, 2012). This continuous devolution of powers has hollowed out the federal level, diminishing the incentive for the two language groups to work together (Hooghe, 2004). Second, Belgium, with its opposition between the Flemish and Francophones, is a prime example of a dyadic federation: a divided state characterised by its federal system dominated by two clear communities (Niessen et al., 2020; Swenden & Jans, 2006). As there are only two dominant groups, alliances cannot shift, creating a sharp opposition between the language groups (Vandenberghe, 2023). Third, the Belgian process of devolution has gone hand in hand with the development of a consociational system, forcing the two linguistic groups into a coalition at the federal level (Caluwaerts & Reuchamps, 2020). The combination of these three features – being a dyadic federation with a far-driven devolution and a consociational structure – means that there is little incentive for the two language groups to cooperate, even if parties belong to the same family. This situation also makes Belgium very prone to instability. Indeed, the country has been confronted with arduous government formations and political deadlocks due to the sharp opposition between Flanders, with a right-wing majority, and Wallonia, with a traditionally left-leaning majority (Baudewyns et al., 2015; Caluwaerts & Reuchamps, 2022; Dandoy & Lebrun, 2021; Pilet, 2021). It is important to note, however, that these differences in political representation cannot automatically be translated into regional differences in Belgian public opinion, as these are less pronounced than is routinely assumed (Billiet et al., 2015; De Jonge, 2021; Deschouwer et al., 2014; Deschouwer et al., 2015; Niessen et al., 2022).

Moreover, Belgium's far-driven federalisation has resulted in the creation of two distinct political systems, leading to a complete regionalisation of the party system and the disappearance of state-wide parties (De Winter et al., 2006; Verleden, 2009). In the 1960s and 1970s, the three main national parties (Catholic, Liberal, and Socialist) each split into two regional parties. The split of the Catholic party into two separate regional parties in 1968 was followed by the Liberal party and eventually the Socialist party in 1978, leading to the creation of three party families, each consisting of two sibling parties. Since then, parties in Belgium are segregated along

the linguistic divide, except the radical left party PVDA/PTB that has established itself on the federal level since 2014 (Delwit & Lebrun, 2021). In total, there are five party families in Belgium: (1) the Radical left (PVDA/PTB), (2) the Green (Groen-Ecolo), (3) the Socialist (Vooruit-PS)², (4) the Christian-Democrat (CD&V-Les Engagés)³, and (5) the Liberal (Open VLD-MR) party family (Delwit & Lebrun, 2021). Unlike the other Belgian party families, Groen and Ecolo have been two separate parties since their existence, each having developed in their respective linguistic regions (Legein, 2021; Pilet & Talukder, 2021). Paradoxically, both have close ties and, next to the radical left, at the level of the party structure, the Green party family is the most cohesive one in Belgium (Legein, 2021; Pilet & Talukder, 2021).

In addition to not having state-wide parties (except for the radical left) that could enable stability, multiple factors possibly deteriorate the cohesion of the Belgian party families. For instance, the families differ in structure and organisation, with some still sharing inter-regional collaborative structures (e.g., the Greens), while others do not (e.g., the Liberals) (Thijssen et al., 2021).




Figure 1 Results of the Belgian elections for the Federal Parliament, 26 May 2019 (vote share in percentages per region)

Note. Data from Ministry of the Interior.

2 In 2021 the Flemish socialist party changed its name from sp.a to Vooruit. As the Belgian election study dates from 2019, this article uses the name sp.a when presenting and discussing the results.

3 In 2022, the Walloon Christian-Democrat party changed its name from cdH to Les Engagés. Again, results will be discussed using the name of the party at the time of the survey (2019).

Furthermore, since 2007, the traditional sibling parties have not necessarily governed together at the federal level, nor is government participation on one level automatically associated with participation on another level. Last, and more importantly, the creation of two distinct party systems has led to some discrepancies between the party systems in each language region. In Flanders, there is a well-established right-wing sub-state nationalist party (Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie - N-VA) and a well-established radical-right nationalist party (Vlaams Belang - VB), which is not the case in Wallonia (De Jonge, 2021; van Haute, 2021). In contrast, in the French-speaking part of the country, the “niche” party DéFI represents French-speaking Brussels residents (Talukder, 2021). Although Belgium has a regionalist party in each community, the parties differ too much in ideology to be considered one party family (Delwit & Lebrun, 2021). Similarly, the Flemish radical-right party Vlaams Belang (VB) and the Walloon radical-right party Parti Populaire (PP) might be considered one single party family, but PP does not meet the electoral threshold, rendering it a trivial party in Wallonia. The consequence of such different party offers is that voters can choose from different options, making it hard to find similarities between the parties’ electorates. This different offer might also explain the differences in electoral results: as can be seen in Figure 1, the sibling parties of the same party family differ significantly in their vote share.

The fact that the party system in Belgium is different between its two regions makes it the ideal case to investigate whether the vote choice of voters of the same family has been shaped by this linguistic divide. Indeed, with no state-wide parties and sibling parties that operate in very different party systems, it becomes difficult for party families to act as a cross-cutting cleavage on the individual level. If, however, party families are still able to attract similar voters across the linguistic divide in a country like Belgium, it is more likely that this same phenomenon occurs in other divided societies.

Hypothesis

There is reason to believe that sibling parties, although belonging to the same party family, attract different voter profiles. Indeed, due to the regionalisation of the party system, parties may be confronted with a different party system compared to their regional ideological counterparts (Hepburn & Detterbeck, 2013). First, the creation of distinct party systems may lead to the emergence of specific parties that become part of the political landscape in a region. The arrival or further development of sub-state nationalist parties is a good example of such a situation occurring. Second, parties may adapt their position on specific cleavages. Not only because they need to appeal to a segregated electorate, but also to react to competing parties. As such, parties might offer policy alternatives that are specific to the region’s situation (Medeiros et al., 2022). For example, research indicates that nationalist movements

influence social policymaking through agenda-setting, even if they do not govern themselves directly (Béland & Lecours, 2005). Thus, as regions develop their own political systems, the political offer, as well as the political demand, may become specific to the region itself. Consequently, this could have implications for the cohesion of party families and their ability to attract similar voters across the ethnocultural cleavage, as the determinants of vote choice for parties within the same family may differ for voters from different regions. Hence, it could be expected that there will be considerable differences in voting behaviour between voters from different regions who vote for the same party family.

However, there is ample reason to believe that party families are able to crosscut the ethnocultural cleavage. As mentioned before, recent studies suggest that ideology, values, and partisanship remain important determinants of the vote choice, which are even more important than the ethnocultural group voters belong to. Moreover, parties still come together at a national level to make or influence policy for all citizens, not just for a specific region or ethnolinguistic group, with sibling parties often forming one bloc or representing the same policy preferences. Thus even in Belgium, where state-wide parties have been split along the linguistic divide for a long period, and although some expected that the voters of the two regions would eventually drift apart (Billiet et al., 2006), recent research indicates that no such regional divergence occurred (Hooghe & Stiers, 2022a). As such, determinants of the vote choice for parties of the same family could be similar, regardless of the region to which voters belong. In other words, it could be expected that there will be no considerable differences in voting behaviour between voters from different regions who vote for the same party family.

Thus, despite earlier expectations, but based on recent literature and findings, it is hypothesised that *there are no considerable differences between voters from different regions who vote for the same party family*. In that case, the regional differences that are found within public opinion can be due to the regional distribution of political preferences – that is, certain political preferences are more common in one region than in the other(s) – with no differences to be found within a party family. In the empirical part, this paper tests whether party families are able to crosscut the ethno-linguistic divide by attracting voters with a similar profile. This article contributes to the literature by examining whether this phenomenon occurs in Belgium, a notable example of a divided society.

Data and Methods

Data

This study is based on CSES-Belgium 2019 data. This survey was conducted by the Centre for Political Science Research (KU Leuven). A random sample of the Belgian population received the questionnaire that could be completed online or on paper. The use of this dataset offers three advantages. First, this election study is currently the most recent one for which results are available. Second, the 2019 election survey is well-suited for examining regional differences in determinants of vote choice, as the questionnaire was administered in both regions of the country. As such, the dataset consists of both 1,087 Flemish and 733 Walloon respondents. However, it is essential to note that the election survey overrepresents Groen, Ecolo, and MR voters compared to the actual election results of 2019 (see Appendix A). Third, the study has multiple questions relating to the Belgian context specifically. In line with previous Belgian election studies, the survey was only conducted in the two major regions of the country, and it therefore does not include information on the bilingual region of the capital Brussels or on the smaller German language region.

As stated above, there are five party families; however, the radical left family (PVDA-PTB) accounts for only 89 respondents in the dataset, making it impossible to include them in this analysis. Therefore, the analysis will only include (1) the Green, (2) the Socialist, (3) the Christian-Democrat and (4) the Liberal party family. This study aims to broaden the analysis of regional differences and similarities in the vote choice in divided societies by including other determinants of the vote besides the ideological dimension.

Dependent variable

The dependent variable in this study is the party the respondent voted for, which respondents indicated by selecting the party they voted for during the Belgian national election on May 26, 2019. Only respondents who voted for one of the four aforementioned party families are included in the analysis. In the multinomial regression, the vote choice of Walloon and Flemish respondents is examined separately. In the logistic regression, however, the vote choice of Walloon and Flemish respondents is combined so that respondents who voted for a sibling party of the same family are taken together. The dependent variable is binary coded, with a vote for the party (family) under study coded as 1 and a vote for any other party (family) coded as 0.

Independent variables

The analyses include a series of variables related to ideological and policy preferences of voters. Medeiros et al. (2015) have highlighted the importance of distinguishing ideology into three dimensions: economic, cultural, and centre-periphery,

as each has a significant impact on vote choice in societies with an ethno-regionalist cleavage. These three dimensions also play an important role in the Belgian context (Hooghe & Stiers, 2022b). Separating ideology into economic and cultural dimensions is not specific to research in divided societies and has been suggested as a method to gain a better understanding of the nature of political ideology (Feldman & Johnston, 2014).

The economic dimension refers to preferences for economic redistribution and state intervention in the economy (Johnston & Ollerenshaw, 2020). This dimension is, in line with previous research, measured by asking respondents whether they believe the government should take measures to reduce income inequality. Respondents could indicate whether they completely agree (1) or completely disagree (5) with this statement. For ease of interpretation, this variable was recoded so that a higher value indicates stronger support for government intervention.

The cultural dimension refers to preferences regarding cultural norms with an opposition between individual liberty (liberal) and traditional norms (conservative) (Johnston & Ollerenshaw, 2020). The liberal-conservative divide is reflected in citizens' attitudes toward immigrants, which significantly influence political preferences (Malloy, Ozkok, & Rosborough, 2022). The cultural dimension is measured by the ESS-scale on anti-immigrant sentiments, combining three survey items that assess the extent to which respondents feel that immigrants are good for the economy, enrich the cultural life, and make Belgium a better place to live. The combination of these survey items forms a reliable scale, with a Cronbach's alpha of 0.88, where higher scores indicate a more positive attitude toward immigrants.

The centre-periphery cleavage is highly salient in divided societies and is therefore included in the analyses. The position of individuals on this cleavage refers to citizens' preferences for the (de)centralisation of competences (Medeiros et al., 2015). Respondents were asked to indicate on an 11-point scale whether they would like to place more powers with regional entities (score 0) or with the federal state (score 10), with the possibility of indicating a preference for a status quo (score 5). A higher score thus indicates a stronger support for the centralisation of competences.

This study takes a broader approach by not only focusing on these ideological dimensions as determinants of the vote choice, but also on two other policy preferences that have been shown to affect voting behaviour. First, support for further European integration is included as an independent variable. Research has shown that voters tend to support parties with similar attitudes toward the European Union (Pannico & Lobo, 2023). In the survey, respondents were asked whether European integration has gone too far (0) or should go further (10), with the option to indicate a preference for the status quo (score 5).

Second, the degree of environmental concern is also taken into account. Environmental concern is considered a postmaterialist value, which has gained importance

since the late 1960s (Beaudonnet & Vasilopoulos, 2014). Although research defines environmental concern as a cross-party issue, more recent studies contest this, attributing high levels of environmental concern to Green Party voters (Beaudonnet & Vasilopoulos, 2014; Vasilopoulos & Demertzis, 2013). The variable is included here with the assumption that it will have a significant positive effect on casting a vote for both Green parties. However, its effect on other parties and the presence of regional differences remains uncertain. In the survey, respondents could indicate whether they thought more or less should be spent on environmental policy and on mitigating climate change. The answers to these two questions, as they are strongly correlated ($r = 0.6$), were combined to form the 5-point environmental concern scale, with higher scores indicating a higher degree of environmental concern.

Control variables

Based on previous studies, this analysis also includes a series of control variables (Beaudonnet & Vasilopoulos, 2014; Deschouwer et al., 2014; van Haute et al., 2013). First, some basic sociodemographic characteristics are included, namely (1) gender, a dummy variable with female as reference category, (2) age, calculated by subtracting the respondent's year of birth from the year of the survey (2019), (3) education level, divided into three categories, with the lowest education level as reference, and (4) a dummy variable about living environment (rural/urban) with rural as reference category. Additionally, (5) income is taken into account, measured by the respondent's net family income and divided into seven response categories, and (6) respondents' work status. For respondents' work status, the focus here is on whether respondents were or are employees, self-employed, or unemployed. This variable was divided into three categories, with unemployed as the reference category. Lastly, (7) religious involvement, measured by the frequency of religious service attendance and categorised into three levels, is added as a control variable. A more detailed description of all variables can be found in Appendix B.

Methods

In order to assess whether party families act as a cross-cutting cleavage, in this study, we investigate whether the determinants of the vote choice for regional parties of the same party family (i.e., sibling parties) differ between Walloon and Flemish voters. This analysis will be conducted in three steps. In the first step, an independent samples t-test is conducted, including all respondents, to compare the averages of the independent variables between Flemish and Walloon voters. This purely descriptive step allows us to identify the main regional differences in Belgian public opinion in 2019. In a second step, multinomial logistic regression models are estimated to assess what the determinants of the vote choice are for the parties in Flanders and Wallonia separately. This analysis, however, is limited to respondents

who voted for one of the four party families with two sibling parties in Belgium. In a third step, logistic regression models are estimated per party family (for both regions combined). These models include interaction effects between the determinants of vote choice and the region where the respondent lives. This interaction allows for testing the essence of this study, as a significant interaction effect would be an indication of a regional difference in the determinants of the vote choice for the party family under study.

Results

Public opinion in Belgium

The first step (Table 1) compares the mean position of Flemish and Walloon voters on ideological self-placement and the independent variables included in this study.

Table 1 Results Independent Samples t-Test comparing Public Opinion in Flanders and Wallonia

Variable	Mean Flanders	Mean Wallonia	Difference
Ideological self-placement	5.63	4.80	0.824***
Support for redistribution	3.95	4.11	0.153**
Attitude towards immigrants	4.87	5.17	0.303**
Support for centralisation	4.65	5.83	1.180***
Support for European integration	5.35	5.25	0.102
Environmental concern	3.56	3.72	0.161***

Note. CSES Belgium 2019. Significance levels: * $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$.

This analysis reveals that the two language groups differ significantly in nearly all the variables examined. One of the sharpest differences remains the regional difference in ideological self-placement: Flemish voters place themselves on the centre-right side of the ideological spectrum while Walloon voters place themselves on the centre-left side. When examining support for redistribution and attitudes toward immigrants, significant regional differences also emerge. However, these differences are less pronounced than with regard to ideological self-placement, with both groups taking a more central position on both dimensions. Conversely, Flemings and Walloons differ most starkly on the linguistic cleavage. There is a significant and considerable gap of more than one point between the mean positions on the

support for the centralisation of powers, with a slight preference for decentralisation of powers in Flanders, opposed to a slight preference for centralisation in Wallonia. Turning to the other potential determinants of the vote choice, the gap between the groups seems smaller: there is no significant regional difference in support for European integration, and the regional difference in the level of environmental concern is only minimal.

The results of this analysis are in line with previous research. On specific points, such as ideological self-placement and on the linguistic cleavage, substantial differences between Flemish and Walloon voters remain. On other points, when looking at the separate dimensions of ideology, support for European integration, and environmental concern, the gap between the two language communities is more nuanced, with relatively minor differences. The question, therefore, remains whether these differences persist when looking specifically within party families.

Party families across the divide

The results of the multinomial regression models, performed separately for Flanders and Wallonia, can be found in Tables C.1 and C.2 (Appendix C). For the ease of interpretation and presentation, we present the average marginal effects of the main variables per party families in Figure 2. This step of the analysis is crucial in assessing how the different determinants influence vote choice and thus indicates which voters the four parties attract, respectively. Furthermore, it also provides an initial indication of possible regional differences within party families. The control variables are not further discussed in this section, nor presented in the figures, but are reported in the full model included in the appendix. These control variables are in some cases important in explaining the vote choice, with, for example, religious involvement affecting voting for cdH and CD&V, or employment status affecting voting for Open VLD.

As can be seen, in some crucial aspects parties of the same family attract voters with similar profiles. That is, when a determinant of the vote choice is significant for a party, it is also significant for its sibling party. For example, for the two Green parties, there is a significant average marginal effect of environmental concern of 0.201 on voting for Groen and 0.158 on voting for Ecolo. Thus, with each unit-change in being concerned about the environment, the probability of voting for Groen and Ecolo increases by 20.05 percentage points and by 15.76 percentage points respectively. Additionally, there is a significant positive average marginal effect (AME) of both the economic and cultural dimension of ideology on voting for both Green parties. Support for redistribution has a positive AME of 0.054 and 0.066, while attitude towards immigrants has a positive AME of 0.028 and 0.023 on voting for Groen and Ecolo respectively. Similarly, supporting government intervention to reduce

economic inequality decreases both the likelihood of voting for Open VLD and MR with 7.68 and 10.64 percentage points respectively.




Figure 2 Average marginal effects of determinants of the vote choice

Note: Results are average marginal effects of models presented in Table C.1 (FL) and C.2. (WL) in Appendix C

However, these similarities are not present for all determinants. For instance, support for further European integration has a significant negative average marginal effect on voting for Groen and sp.a, and a significant positive AME on voting for Open VLD, yet the variable has no effect for any of these parties' regional counterparts. A similar situation occurs for support for centralisation: while there is a significant negative AME of -0.021 on voting for PS and a significant positive AME of 0.025 on voting for MR, support for centralisation plays no significant role in the vote choice for sp.a and Open VLD. However, it is important to note that, although this analysis provides an overview of the role that the determinants of the vote choice play in both regions and gives a first indication of possible divergence within party families, it provides no answer yet to the question whether these effects truly differ within the same party family. To address this, a logistic regression including interaction effects is performed for each family separately, including both French language and Dutch language respondents. The results of this step are displayed in Tables D.1 to D.4 (Appendix D), with the results also presented as average marginal effects in Figure 3.

The results of this analysis allow us to investigate to what extent the observed differences between sibling parties are significant or not. Overall, these results confirm what was hypothesised: there are no considerable differences between voters from different regions who vote for the same party family. Indeed, there are no significant differences between voters of sibling parties in terms of core ideological preferences. The interaction-effects between region and support for redistribution, and region and attitude towards immigrants are not significant for any of the party families. This entails that sibling parties attract similar voters in terms of the economic and cultural ideological dimensions.

The results indicate that there are no indications of significant regional differences within the Green party family, suggesting that the sibling parties Groen and Ecolo attract similar voters across the linguistic divide and can indeed be considered a very coherent party family. Environmental concern is the most important determinant in explaining a vote for both green parties. This result aligns with previous research, which has demonstrated that green voters in Europe share a very similar profile across national borders (Beaudonnet & Vasilopoulos, 2014). Similarly, no regional differences appear between CD&V and cdH, with both Christian-Democrat parties being situated in the middle of the left-right divide, confirming their role as centrist parties. Conversely, there is an indication of regional differences in voting determinants for the Socialist and Liberal party families.




Figure 3 Regional differences in determinants of the vote choice for the party families

Note: Results are average marginal effects of models presented in Table D.1, D.2, D.3, and D.4 in Appendix D

Although no regional differences emerge when looking at the economic and cultural dimensions, some differences appear for the centre-periphery dimension. The regional difference in the effect of support for centralisation between the Socialist parties and the Liberal parties found in the previous step is confirmed by significant interaction effects. A higher level of support for centralisation decreases the likelihood of voting for PS with 2.14 percentage points, while support for centralisation does not significantly influence the vote choice for sp.a. Similarly, a higher level of support for centralisation increases the likelihood of voting for MR with 2.49 percentage points, while the determinant has no significant effect for Open VLD-voters.

Lastly, it can be noted that aside from the difference in support for centralisation, there is also a regional difference in the effect of support for further European integration within the Liberal party family. As mentioned in the second step, support for European integration plays a significant positive role in the vote choice for the Flemish Liberals as a higher level of support raises the likelihood of voting for Open VLD with 4.83 percentage points. Yet, this support plays no role for the Walloon Liberals, a finding confirmed by a significant negative interaction effect.

Conclusion

This study aimed to add to the debate on whether voters drift apart in divided societies. It did so by focusing more specifically on the role of party families, which consist of two regional sibling parties that share the same ideology, as a cross-cutting cleavage at the individual level. The results indicate that, when looking at regional differences within party families, instead of opposing the Flemish and Walloon public opinion as two homogenous blocks, considerably fewer differences are found. While the results of the first step of the analysis indicated that the two communities differ significantly on almost all variables, the contrasts between the two language groups become more nuanced when comparing only Flemish and Walloon voters of the same ideological party family. Indeed, it can be observed that most differences do not occur within party families, and those that do are not always consistent with the general differences. It thus appears that party families are relatively successful in transcending the ethnolinguistic cleavage on the individual level. The fact that two major Flemish parties do not have a sibling party in the Walloon region might therefore be one of the elements explaining why we do find a difference in public opinion between the two regions on an aggregate level. That is, the regional differences that are found within public opinion are due to the regional distribution of political preferences, with certain political preferences being more common in one region than the other, but with no differences to be found *within* a party family.

It is important to note, however, that not all sibling parties are equally successful in attracting voters with a similar profile. Especially, the Liberal party family is less successful in doing so, with specific regional differences occurring. Furthermore, there is an indication of some regional differences when it comes to the effect of support for centralisation. Thus, although limited, the creation of two distinct party systems seems to have caused some divergence in how specific determinants influence the vote choice.

While not the principal focus of this research, these findings could also have important implications for the debate on the (in)stability of divided societies. As stated before, ideology could act as an important cross-cutting cleavage, ensuring that voters are not merely divided based on region, but share elements – i.e., ideological

preferences – with voters from all regions. Statewide parties might facilitate the cross-cutting function of ideology, as voters who share ideological preferences can vote for one and the same party, regardless of the region they belong to. Additionally, it also ensures that parties do not mobilise voters on the ethnocultural cleavage as they have to appeal to the entirety of the electorate. The question then remains what happens in the absence of state-wide parties, when the party system is split along the linguistic divide, as is the case in Belgium. The results of this paper suggest that party families have the same cross-cutting function on the individual level as state-wide parties have. Indeed, there are few, sometimes even no differences in the determinants of the vote choice of voters who belong to a different region, yet vote for the same party family. Party families' ability to cross-cut the linguistic cleavage on the individual level in Belgium may therefore be one of the factors contributing to the country's relative stability as a divided society, despite the absence of a state-wide party system. These findings may also have important implications for other divided societies: parties established in different regions but belonging to the same party family may act as stabilising factors due to their cross-cutting function. However, further comparative research studying voting and party behaviour in divided societies is necessary to harden this claim. Investigating both voting and party behaviour in the context of absent state-wide parties is therefore not only interesting for electoral research and party politics, but it is also relevant as this might have important implications for the overall stability of divided societies.

It is also important to acknowledge some limitations of this study. First, the results should be approached with some caution. As the analysis is limited to four party families, only 740 observations were included. Second, it is worth noting that this study is limited to a single point in time, specifically the period immediately following the 2019 elections. So, it is possible that the observed differences and similarities in determinants of the vote choice only apply to 2019 and differ from other years. To truly speak of party families functioning as a cross-cutting cleavage on the individual level, research should investigate whether regional differences and similarities within party families remain stable over time. Third, as this study is limited to assessing whether Belgian party families attract similar voters across the regional divide, it can only be concluded that voters of the Belgian mainstream and green parties show little to no regional differences in their voting behaviour. However, in the 2019 elections we investigated, 47.40% of Flemish voters voted for the regionalist parties N-VA and Vlaams Belang. There are Walloon nationalist parties that might theoretically serve as regional counterparts, but these parties remain too small and have too few respondents in the survey to perform analyses assessing whether regional similarities also occur within these party families. Thus, although important similarities exist between Walloon and Flemish voters of the mainstream and green party families, this study cannot provide an explanation for the stark differences that remain in the party system between the two Belgian regions. If Walloon and Flemish

voters are not that different, how come that two well-established parties in Flanders are absent or barely present in Wallonia? Future research could further explore this particular situation of the Belgian system. Lastly, it is worth mentioning that the current study only investigated voter behaviour. The fact that there are few regional differences among the electorate of the same party family could have implications for party behaviour, as sibling parties might be incentivised by working together and present one and the same point of view on the federal level. However, the behaviour and rhetoric of party elites may differ from that of their voters. Party elites' behaviour, irrespective of voter behaviour, is a crucial aspect in whether conflicts on the ethnocultural cleavage will be moderated or exacerbated. Differences between voter behaviour and party behaviour, and the moderating role parties (could) play in divided societies remain topics in need of further research.

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Appendices

Appendix A: vote share in CSES-dataset




Figure A.1 Vote share in percentage for the Belgian federal elections in the CSES-survey 2019

Note. CSES-Belgium 2019

Appendix B: overview of included variables

Dependent variables

Party voted for in the federal elections of 2019

Respondent were asked to indicate for which party they voted during the federal (Belgian) elections of 26 May 2019. Separately for each region, only Walloon respondents who indicated they voted for Ecolo, PS, cdH or MR and Flemish respondents who indicated they voted for Groen, sp.a, CD&V or Open VLD were included in this analysis. The variable is dummy coded with 1 meaning voted for the party in question and 0 voted for any of the three other parties.

Party family voted for in the federal elections of 2019

Flemish and Walloon voters who indicated that they voted for a party of the same party family were grouped together. The variable is dummy coded with 1 meaning voted for a party of the party family in question and 0 meaning voted for any of the three other party families.

Independent variables

Economic redistribution

Respondents were asked: "To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels". They could answer using a scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree).

Attitude towards immigrants

Respondents were asked to answer three items:

- "Would you say it is generally bad or good for Belgium's economy that people come to live here from other countries?"
- "Would you say that Belgium's cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?"
- "Did Belgium become a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?"

The answers to these three questions form the scale of attitude towards immigration. The Cronbach's alpha equals 0.881, indicating a reliable scale. A higher score on the scale indicates a more positive attitude towards immigrants.

Support for Centralisation

Respondents were asked: "Some people think that more powers should go to the regions and communities. Other people think that more powers should go to the federal state. Where would you place your opinion on a scale ranging from 0 to 10, where 0 means that Regions and Communities should have all the competences, and 10 means that all the competences should be attributed to the federal State? The value 5 means that you agree with the current situation."

Support for European integration

Respondents were asked: "Some people believe that the European integration should go further. Others believe that it has already gone too far. Where would you place your own views on a scale from 0 to 10. 0 means that the integration has already

gone too far, and 10 means integration should continue. With score 5 you indicate that the situation is good as it is."

Environmental concern

Respondents were asked: "Indicate below whether the government should spend more or less on these matters. Keep in mind that when you indicate "more", this could entail an increase of taxes and if you indicate "less", this could entail a decrease in services." Respondents could indicate whether they think "much more" (1) or "much less" (5) should be spent.

Six matters were questioned, among which environmental policy and climate change. The answer on both these variables forms the scale of environmental concern, with a Cronbach's alpha of 0.814. The variable environmental concern was rescaled in such a way that a higher score indicates a higher degree of environmental concern.

Control variables

Sex

Sex of the respondent with 0 = female and 1 = male.

Age

Age of the respondent in years (2019 – birthyear)

Educational level

Educational level of the respondent. Respondents could indicate nine options which were grouped into three categories: (1) low (none, primary, lower secondary education), (2) middle (higher secondary education, post-secondary non-higher education, higher education short cycle) and (3) high (higher education bachelor, higher education master, doctorate).

Living environment

Living environment of the respondents, split into two categories: 0 = rural (town or small municipality) and 1 = urban (city).

Income

Respondents were asked to indicate their net household income based on seven categories ranging (category 1 = less than 1000€ a month, category 7 = more than 5000€ a month).

Region

Region in which the respondent lives with 0 being Flanders and 1 being Wallonia.

Employment status

The variable employment status, consisting of 3 categories (1) unemployed, (2) self-employed and (3) employee, is based on two questions. First respondents could indicate their employment status based on ten categories, brought back to two: employed or unemployed. The respondents who indicated they are employed, were further divided into two categories, self-employed or employee, based on the question “for whom do you work?”

Religious involvement

Respondents were asked: “How often do you participate in religious or philosophical services, not including weddings and funerals?”. Respondents could choose out of six answer options which were combined in three categories: (1) never (never), (2) sometimes (once a year or two to eleven times a year) and (3) often (once a month, two or more times a month or at least once a week).

Table B.1 Descriptives of the independent variables

	N	Min.	Max.	Mean	Standard deviation
Ideological self-placement	1695	0	10	5.30	2.35
Support for redistribution	1803	1	5	1.98	1.09
Attitude towards immigrants	1770	0	10	4.99	2.10
Support for centralisation	1731	0	10	5.12	2.71
Support for European integration	1760	0	10	7.96	2.46
Environmental concern	1753	0	10	7.45	2.85

Note. CSES-Belgium 2019

Appendix C: results of multinomial regression analyses per region

Table C.1 Results of multinomial regression analysis for Flandres

Reference: Groen	sp.a B (s.e.)	CD&V B (s.e.)	Open VLD B (s.e.)
Support for redistribution	-0.082 (0.206)	-0.377* (0.178)	-0.718*** (0.178)
Attitude toward immigrants	-0.187 (0.127)	-0.132 (0.117)	-0.333** (0.121)
Support for centralisation	0.065 (0.083)	-0.021 (0.075)	-0.052 (0.074)
Support for European integration	-0.022 (0.101)	0.118 (0.090)	0.379*** (0.093)
Environmental concern	-1.292*** (0.291)	-1.529*** (0.269)	-1.700*** (0.280)
Sex (female)	-0.345 (0.373)	-0.121 (0.338)	-0.137 (0.352)
Age	0.039** (0.014)	0.026* (0.012)	0.011 (0.012)
Education level (low)			
Middle	0.200 (0.729)	-0.312 (0.686)	-0.143 (0.728)
High	-0.775 (0.766)	-0.703 (0.703)	-0.073 (0.728)
Living environment (rural)	-0.317 (0.401)	-0.651 (0.371)	-0.592 (0.381)
Income	-0.132 (0.142)	-0.050 (0.124)	0.022 (0.126)
Employment status (unemployed)			
Self-employed	-1.329 (1.159)	0.192 (0.631)	-0.708 (0.628)
Employee	0.690 (0.496)	0.099 (0.446)	-1.281** (0.452)

Reference: Groen	sp.a B (s.e)	CD&V B (s.e.)	Open VLD B (s.e.)
Religious involvement (never)			
Sometimes	-0.027 (0.380)	1.293*** (0.357)	0.290 (0.355)
Often	-1.011 (0.764)	1.668** (0.597)	-0.775 (0.731)
Intercept	5.002** (1.866)	6.810*** (1.672)	9.818*** (1.701)
N	404		
Pseudo R²	0.246		

Note. CSES Belgium 2019. Significance levels: * $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$.

Table C.2 Results of multinomial regression analysis for Wallonia

Reference: Ecolo	PS B (s.e)	cdH B (s.e.)	MR B (s.e.)
Support for redistribution	-0.246 (0.181)	-0.333 (0.206)	-0.808*** (0.171)
Attitude toward immigrants	-0.140 (0.096)	-0.257* (0.118)	-0.158 (0.100)
Support for centralisation	-0.034 (0.071)	0.109 (0.087)	0.158* (0.074)
Support for European integration	-0.035 (0.065)	0.020 (0.080)	-0.013 (0.067)
Environmental concern	-1.018*** (0.234)	-1.259*** (0.265)	-1.251*** (0.236)
Sex (female)	0.285 (0.334)	0.611 (0.403)	0.251 (0.335)
Age	0.032* (0.013)	0.029 (0.015)	0.030* (0.012)
Education level (low)			
Middle	-1.124 (0.634)	-0.198 (0.796)	-0.517 (0.687)
High	-1.475* (0.699)	0.348 (0.853)	-0.186 (0.733)

Reference: Ecolo	PS B (s.e)	cdH B (s.e.)	MR B (s.e.)
Living environment (rural)	0.223 (0.513)	-0.130 (0.676)	0.147 (0.519)
Income	-0.157 (0.133)	0.021 (0.161)	-0.021 (0.131)
Employment status (unemployed)			
Self-employed	-0.796 (0.841)	0.729 (0.829)	0.460 (0.680)
Employee	0.478 (0.421)	0.509 (0.516)	0.025 (0.417)
Religious involvement (never)			
Sometimes	0.328 (0.373)	1.110* (0.441)	1.083** (0.359)
Often	0.839 (0.660)	2.916*** (0.662)	0.463 (0.730)
Intercept	6.087*** (1.534)	3.626* (1.801)	6.830*** (1.513)
N	381		
Pseudo R²	0.206		

Note. CSES Belgium 2019. Significance levels: * $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$.

Appendix D: results of logistic regression analyses with interaction-effects per party family

Table D.1 Results logistic regression analysis with interaction-effects for the Green party family

	Vote for Green Party Family					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Support for redistribution	0.482*** (0.105)	0.467*** (0.141)	0.486*** (0.105)	0.482*** (0.105)	0.480*** (0.105)	0.481*** (0.105)
Attitude toward immigrants	0.184** (0.064)	0.183** (0.065)	0.215* (0.094)	0.181** (0.064)	0.184** (0.064)	0.189** (0.065)
Support for centralisation	-0.022 (0.043)	-0.022 (0.043)	-0.023 (0.044)	0.020 (0.060)	-0.021 (0.044)	-0.023 (0.043)
Support for European integration	-0.064 (0.046)	-0.064 (0.046)	-0.063 (0.046)	-0.060 (0.046)	-0.125 (0.069)	-0.065 (0.046)
Environmental concern	1.298*** (0.155)	1.298*** (0.155)	1.300*** (0.155)	1.294*** (0.155)	1.315*** (0.156)	1.420*** (0.223)
Region	-0.006 (0.205)	-0.132 (0.828)	0.325 (0.743)	0.462 (0.508)	-0.631 (0.560)	0.985 (1.282)
Sex (female)	-0.053 (0.198)	-0.053 (0.198)	-0.058 (0.198)	-0.050 (0.198)	-0.053 (0.198)	-0.039 (0.199)
Age	-0.023*** (0.007)	-0.023*** (0.007)	-0.023** (0.007)	-0.023** (0.007)	-0.023*** (0.007)	-0.023*** (0.007)
Education level (low)						
Middle	0.449 (0.438)	0.451 (0.438)	0.451 (0.438)	0.475 (0.438)	0.415 (0.438)	0.346 (0.249)
High	0.616 (0.457)	0.619 (0.457)	0.619 (0.457)	0.628 (0.456)	0.578 (0.457)	0.460 (0.437)
Living environment (rural)	0.362 (0.247)	0.363 (0.247)	0.356 (0.248)	0.353 (0.248)	0.377 (0.247)	0.346 (0.249)
Income	0.055 (0.075)	0.055 (0.075)	0.056 (0.075)	0.052 (0.075)	0.057 (0.075)	0.056 (0.075)

	Vote for Green Party Family					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Employment status (unemployed)						
Self-employed	0.161 (0.386)	0.153 (0.389)	0.155 (0.387)	0.181 (0.387)	0.177 (0.386)	0.137 (0.389)
Employee	0.122 (0.246)	0.120 (0.246)	0.120 (0.246)	0.147 (0.248)	0.121 (0.246)	0.104 (0.247)
Religious involvement (never)						
Sometimes	-0.639** (0.209)	-0.638** (0.210)	-0.629** (0.211)	-0.636** (0.210)	-0.665** (0.211)	-0.634** (0.210)
Often	-0.934* (0.398)	-0.933* (0.399)	-0.934* (0.398)	-0.940* (0.399)	-0.953* (0.400)	-0.905* (0.400)
Region X Support for redistribution		0.031 (0.197)				
Region X Attitude toward immigrants			-0.055 (0.118)			
Region X Support for centralisation				-0.084 (0.084)		
Region X Support for European integration					0.098 (0.082)	
Region X Environmental concern						-0.233 (0.297)
Intercept	-8.252*** (0.988)	-8.188*** (1.065)	-8.474*** (1.105)	-8.504*** (1.025)	-7.879*** (1.025)	-8.781*** (1.213)
N						
Pseudo R²						

Table D.2 Results logistic regression analysis with interaction-effects for the Socialist party family

	Vote for Socialist Party Family					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Support for redistribution	0.243* (0.100)	0.270 (0.154)	0.244* (0.100)	0.242* (0.100)	0.243* (0.100)	0.242* (0.100)
Attitude toward immigrants	-0.045 (0.056)	-0.045 (0.056)	-0.029 (0.086)	-0.051 (0.056)	-0.042 (0.056)	-0.045 (0.056)
Support for centralisation	-0.057 (0.040)	-0.057 (0.040)	-0.057 (0.040)	0.051 (0.062)	-0.056 (0.040)	-0.057 (0.040)
Support for European integration	-0.080* (0.040)	-0.080* (0.040)	-0.081* (0.040)	-0.079 (0.041)	-0.138* (0.066)	-0.081* (0.040)
Environmental concern	-0.127 (0.113)	-0.129 (0.114)	-0.127 (0.114)	-0.136 (0.115)	-0.116 (0.114)	-0.118 (0.170)
Region	0.521** (0.198)	0.712 (0.839)	0.650 (0.559)	1.462** (0.472)	0.058 (0.461)	0.573 (0.801)
Sex (female)	-0.128 (0.191)	-0.128 (0.191)	-0.126 (0.191)	-0.113 (0.192)	-0.130 (0.191)	-0.127 (0.192)
Age	0.016* (0.007)	0.016* (0.007)	0.016* (0.007)	0.016* (0.008)	0.016* (0.007)	0.016* (0.007)
Education level (low)						
Middle	-0.311 (0.274)	-0.315 (0.275)	-0.311 (0.274)	-0.281 (0.276)	-0.327 (0.275)	-0.310 (0.275)
High	-0.955** (0.329)	-0.959** (0.330)	-0.956** (0.329)	-0.962** (0.331)	-0.969** (0.330)	-0.954** (0.329)
Living environment (rural)	0.098 (0.254)	0.098 (0.254)	0.096 (0.254)	0.095 (0.253)	0.104 (0.255)	0.097 (0.255)
Income	-0.120 (0.076)	-0.120 (0.076)	-0.120 (0.076)	-0.126 (0.076)	-0.117 (0.076)	-0.120 (0.076)

	Vote for Socialist Party Family					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Employment status (unemployed)						
Self-employed	-1.102 (0.574)	-1.096 (0.574)	-1.106 (0.574)	-1.112 (0.578)	-1.078 (0.573)	-1.103 (0.574)
Employee	0.541* (0.247)	0.541* (0.247)	0.543* (0.247)	0.585* (0.249)	0.549* (0.247)	0.541* (0.247)
Religious involvement (never)						
Sometimes	-0.455* (0.206)	-0.456* (0.206)	-0.453* (0.206)	-0.453* (0.206)	-0.462* (0.206)	-0.456* (0.206)
Often	-0.949** (0.341)	-0.953** (0.341)	-0.951** (0.341)	-0.982** (0.343)	-0.939** (0.341)	-0.948** (0.341)
Region X Support for redistribution		-0.046 (0.196)				
Region X Attitude toward immigrants			-0.025 (0.100)			
Region X Support for centralisation				-0.176* (0.079)		
Region X Support for European integration					0.084 (0.076)	
Region X Environmental concern						-0.014 (0.210)
Intercept	-0.775 (0.818)	-0.882 (0.939)	-0.860 (0.888)	-1.306 (0.862)	-0.523 (0.848)	-0.806 (0.937)
N	785					

Table D.3 Results logistic regression analysis with interaction-effects for the Christian-Democrat party family

	Vote for Christian-Democrat Party Family					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Support for redistribution	0.044 (0.094)	0.041 (0.118)	0.044 (0.094)	0.046 (0.094)	0.042 (0.094)	0.046 (0.094)
Attitude toward immigrants	-0.026 (0.061)	-0.026 (0.061)	-0.010 (0.078)	-0.026 (0.061)	-0.024 (0.061)	-0.027 (0.061)
Support for centralisation	0.013 (0.042)	0.013 (0.042)	0.013 (0.042)	-0.022 (0.054)	0.014 (0.042)	0.015 (0.042)
Support for European integration	-0.002 (0.045)	-0.002 (0.045)	-0.002 (0.045)	-0.003 (0.045)	-0.053 (0.058)	-0.001 (0.045)
Environmental concern	-0.348** (0.119)	-0.348** (0.119)	-0.348** (0.119)	-0.340** (0.119)	-0.343** (0.119)	-0.403** (0.153)
Region	-0.903*** (0.203)	-0.927 (0.758)	-0.720 (0.590)	-1.407** (0.519)	-1.517** (0.497)	-1.353 (0.815)
Sex (female)	0.172 (0.195)	0.172 (0.195)	0.172 (0.195)	0.168 (0.196)	0.174 (0.196)	0.163 (0.196)
Age	0.009 (0.007)	0.009 (0.007)	0.009 (0.007)	0.009 (0.007)	0.009 (0.007)	0.009 (0.007)
Education level (low)						
Middle	0.002 (0.304)	0.003 (0.304)	0.006 (0.303)	-0.006 (0.304)	-0.018 (0.306)	-0.016 (0.306)
High	0.068 (0.344)	0.069 (0.345)	0.069 (0.344)	0.071 (0.344)	0.047 (0.346)	0.061 (0.345)
Living environment (rural)	-0.340 (0.261)	-0.340 (0.261)	-0.345 (0.262)	-0.334 (0.261)	-0.337 (0.262)	-0.329 (0.262)
Income	0.009 (0.075)	0.009 (0.076)	0.009 (0.075)	0.010 (0.075)	0.012 (0.076)	0.009 (0.076)

	Vote for Christian-Democrat Party Family					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Employment status (unemployed)						
Self-employed	0.507 (0.369)	0.506 (0.370)	0.509 (0.369)	0.491 (0.369)	0.534 (0.370)	0.513 (0.370)
Employee	0.363 (0.252)	0.363 (0.252)	0.365 (0.252)	0.342 (0.252)	0.369 (0.252)	0.369 (0.252)
Religious involvement (never)						
Sometimes	0.949*** (0.212)	0.949*** (0.212)	0.954*** (0.213)	0.948*** (0.212)	0.939*** (0.212)	0.947*** (0.212)
Often	2.309*** (0.290)	2.310*** (0.290)	2.310*** (0.290)	2.317*** (0.291)	2.321*** (0.290)	2.297*** (0.291)
Region X Support for redistribution		0.006 (0.183)				
Region X Attitude toward immigrants			-0.034 (0.103)			
Region X Support for centralisation				0.088 (0.083)		
Region X Support for European integration					0.105 (0.077)	
Region X Environmental concern						0.122 (0.214)
Intercept	-1.202 (0.813)	-1.194 (0.851)	-1.297 (0.864)	-1.021 (0.830)	-0.912 (0.839)	-0.992 (0.891)
N	785					

Table D.4 Results logistic regression analysis with interaction-effects for the Liberal party family

	Vote for Liberal Party Family					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Support for redistribution	-0.564*** (0.083)	-0.527*** (0.116)	-0.567*** (0.083)	-0.563*** (0.083)	-0.568*** (0.084)	-0.565*** (0.083)
Attitude toward immigrants	-0.096 (0.055)	-0.095 (0.055)	-0.139 (0.080)	-0.091 (0.056)	-0.102 (0.056)	-0.096 (0.055)
Support for centralisation	0.052 (0.038)	0.051 (0.038)	0.053 (0.038)	-0.037 (0.054)	0.051 (0.038)	0.051 (0.038)
Support for European integration	0.108** (0.040)	0.109** (0.040)	0.109** (0.040)	0.106** (0.040)	0.236*** (0.061)	0.108** (0.040)
Environmental concern	-0.500*** (0.110)	-0.504*** (0.111)	-0.497*** (0.110)	-0.491*** (0.111)	-0.519*** (0.111)	-0.479** (0.155)
Region	0.302 (0.182)	0.576 (0.630)	-0.095 (0.560)	-0.692 (0.461)	1.568** (0.487)	0.445 (0.760)
Sex (female)	-0.057 (0.180)	-0.056 (0.180)	-0.062 (0.180)	-0.068 (0.180)	-0.045 (0.181)	-0.053 (0.181)
Age	-0.000 (0.006)	-0.000 (0.006)	-0.000 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.000 (0.006)	-0.000 (0.006)
Education level (low)						
Middle	0.255 (0.298)	0.245 (0.299)	0.247 (0.298)	0.219 (0.300)	0.300 (0.300)	0.260 (0.300)
High	0.490 (0.331)	0.479 (0.332)	0.482 (0.331)	0.472 (0.332)	0.535 (0.333)	0.492 (0.331)
Living environment (rural)	-0.148 (0.235)	-0.150 (0.235)	-0.143 (0.235)	-0.144 (0.236)	-0.149 (0.236)	-0.150 (0.235)
Income	0.089 (0.069)	0.090 (0.069)	0.089 (0.069)	0.090 (0.069)	0.081 (0.069)	0.088 (0.069)

	Vote for Liberal Party Family					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Employment status (unemployed)						
Self-employed	-0.199 (0.332)	-0.181 (0.334)	-0.197 (0.333)	-0.229 (0.335)	-0.261 (0.334)	-0.202 (0.333)
Employee	-0.771*** (0.224)	-0.770*** (0.224)	-0.772*** (0.224)	-0.816*** (0.225)	-0.789*** (0.224)	-0.773*** (0.224)
Religious involvement (never)						
Sometimes	0.240 (0.185)	0.237 (0.185)	0.230 (0.185)	0.247 (0.185)	0.264 (0.186)	0.242 (0.185)
Often	-1.186** (0.362)	-1.197*** (0.363)	-1.187** (0.362)	-1.184** (0.363)	-1.244*** (0.367)	-1.183** (0.362)
Region X Support for redistribution		-0.073 (0.161)				
Region X Attitude toward immigrants			0.072 (0.097)			
Region X Support for centralisation				0.176* (0.075)		
Region X Support for European integration					-0.205** (0.072)	
Region X Environmental concern						-0.038 (0.197)
Intercept	2.319** (0.737)	2.196** (0.785)	2.555** (0.802)	2.796*** (0.765)	1.617* (0.787)	2.241** (0.840)
N	785					